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A CRITIQUE AND COMPARISON OF EN BANC REVIEW IN
THE TENTH AND D.C. CIRCUITS AND UNITED STATES V.
NACCHIO
INTRODUCTION
All federal circuit courts allow for rehearing en banc. The en banc
mechanism enables the full circuit to devote its attention to issues of con-
siderable importance that may not otherwise make it to the Supreme
Court's limited docket.' En banc review is typically the only means
available for overruling precedent and resolving inconsistencies within a
circuit.2 En banc cases are "arguably the most significant cases decided
by the courts of appeals[,] ' '3 receive "more attention in the legal commu-
nity, and are more likely to be reviewed by the U.S. Supreme Court than
are rulings by three-judge panels. ' 4
Standards used to determine the cases appropriate for en banc con-
sideration are, however, complex and convoluted.5 Appellate courts are
divided as to what standards to apply in considering petitions for rehear-
ing en banc and as to the correct method of application. 6  Although
guided by statute,7 each circuit likewise relies on federal and local rules
in determining the standard for en banc review. 8 Despite similar stan-
dards, however, considerable variations exist among the circuits.9
From 2003 to 2007 the Tenth and D.C. Circuits have remained rela-
tively consistent in the number of cases heard en banc.10 Conversely,
1. Pierre H. Bergeron, En Banc Practice in the Sixth Circuit: An Empirical Study, 1990-
2000, 68 TENN. L. REv. 771, 771 (2001).
2. Id.
3. Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision to Grant En Banc
Review, 74 WASH. L. REv. 213, 217-18 (1999) (arguing that en banc cases are "of greater conse-
quence" because en banc procedure (1) limits the number of cases heard by the entire court to those
selected by a majority of the active judges, (2) "expends greater judicial and litigant resources," (3)
exposes the parties and the circuit to inconsistent rulings, and (4) lessens some restraints of the
appellate level of review).
4. Michael E. Solimine, Due Process and En Banc Decisionmaking, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 325,
325 (2006).
5. See George, supra note 3, at 220; Judah 1. Labovitz, Notes, En Banc Procedure in the
Federal Courts ofAppeals, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 220, 221 (1962).
6. See Labovitz, supra note 5, at 221-27.
7. Id. at 220-21(citing 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1958)); see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (West 2009)
("A court in banc shall consist of all circuit judges in regular active service, or such number of
judges as may be prescribed in accordance with Pub. L. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1633 (1978) . .
8. See id. at 221-27.
9. Id. at 221.
10. See ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR:
JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 46 tbl.S-1 (2008), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2OO7/tables/SOISepO7.pdf [hereinafter 2007 ANNUAL REPORT];
ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS
OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 50 tbl.S- 1 (2007), available at
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each circuit's pronounced and underlying reasoning in granting or deny-
ing these petitions has shifted during the five-year period. In addition to
the inconsistent application of en banc standards within each circuit, dis-
crepancies also exist between the two circuits in the interpretation of
substantially similar standards.
Part I of this Comment sets up the legal background and history of
en banc review. Part II surveys the Tenth Circuit's treatment of en banc
review from the years 2003 to 2007. Part 1I discusses the D.C. Circuit's
standards and decisions in respect to en banc review from 2003 to 2007.
Part IV analyzes the Tenth Circuit's decision to rehear United States v.
Nacchio en banc in the context of the Tenth Circuit's prior considera-
tions. Part V explores whether United States v. Nacchio would have
been treated differently if heard in the D.C. Circuit.
I. A HISTORY OF EN BANC REVIEW IN FEDERAL COURTS
A. The Past and Purpose of En Banc Review
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the first circuit courts."i Appel-
late panels consisted of three judges including one circuit judge and two
trial judges. 12 Not until the Evarts Act of 1891 ("The Evarts Act"),
13
however, did Congress create the now familiar three-tiered system of
trial, appellate, and Supreme Courts.14 Each appellate or circuit court
received three judgeships. 15 The Evarts Act also created a certiorari pro-
cedure, ensuring that the Court could decide its own docket and render-
ing the court of appeals the "court of last resort" for the majority of fed-
eral appellate litigants.
16
The adoption of the 1911 Judicial Code extended the judgeships of
appellate courts to more than three, but made no explicit provisions for
en banc review. 17 In the 1920s and 1930s, as caseloads grew, "Congress
authorized more judgeships."1 8 As more judgeships were added the po-
http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2OO6/tables/sI.pdf [hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT]; ADMIN.
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, 40 tbl.S-1 (2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/
tables/sl.pdf [hereinafter 2005 ANNUAL REPORT]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2004
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 37 tbl.S- 1
(2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2OO4/tables/sl.pdf [hereinafter 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT]; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2003 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL
BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, 34 tbl.S-1 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbus2003/tables/s 1.pdf [hereinafter 2003 ANNUAL REPORT].
11. Richard S. Arnold, Why Judges Don't Like Petitions for Rehearing, 3 J. APP. PRAC. &
PROCESS 29, 30 (2001).





17. Id. at 30-31.
18. Id. at 31.
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tential for inconsistent panel decisions increased, providing a growing
need for an administrative solution.
The Ninth Circuit first took up the issue of en banc review in
1938.'9 In 1937, a divided Ninth Circuit panel ruled on an estate tax
issue in Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n v. Commis-
sioner.20 Just one year later in Lang's Estate v. Commissioner,21 a panel
of three different Ninth Circuit judges revisited the same issue but ar-
rived at a different conclusion.22 The two conflicting rulings presented a
uniformity issue within the circuit, with no mechanism in place to re-
solve this conflict. The Lang's Estate panel, "faced with the situation
where the decision of two judges of the circuit made a precedent for the
remaining five," 23 chose to certify the estate tax question to the Supreme
Court rather than overturn the previous panel decision, effectively ruling
24out an en banc process.
Two years after Lang's Estate, the Third Circuit disregarded the
Ninth Circuit's dicta that a court could not sit en banc, and the full court
of five judges heard Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities Corp.
25
The Third Circuit concluded that the court had the "power to provide...
for sessions of the court en banc, consisting of all the circuit judges of
the circuit in active service."26 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
unanimously affirmed, reasoning that, "en banc sittings would make for
'more effective judicial administration' because en banc review would
promote finality of decision within the courts of appeals and would aid in
resolving intra-circuit conflicts. 27
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the "courts of appeals
were empowered, but not required, to sit en banc. 28 A circuit could
"devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby
a majority may order such a hearing." 29 Each circuit, therefore, had the
discretion to determine whether to grant en banc review and to determine
the criteria for granting en banc review. 30 The resulting uncertainty and
inconsistency among the courts of appeals with regard to en banc review
19. Id.
20. 90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1937).
21. 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938).
22. Id. at 869.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 869-70; see also George, supra note 3, at 227-28.
25. 117 F.2d 62, 70-71 (3d Cir. 1940) (en banc), affid, 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
26. Textile Mills, 117 F.2d at 71.
27. Arnold, supra note 11, at 31 (quoting Textile Mills, 314 U.S. at 335). This decision was
codified seven years later in section 46(c) of the Judicial Code of 1948. Id.
28. Id. (citing W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953)).
29. W Pac. R.R., 345 U.S. at 250.
30. Arnold, supra note 11, at 31-32.
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caused Congress to standardize practices through the ratification of Fed-
eral Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.31
B. Purported Standards of En Banc Review
As a hearing by a full panel of all active judges consumes a consi-
derable amount of both the time and resources of the court, the rules go-
verning en banc review are fairly restrictive. The federal and local rules
of several circuits address the potential burden of en banc review, and
state that convening the full court for a hearing is not favored.32
Federal rules governing en banc review include Title 28, Section
46(c) of the United States Code 33 and Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 35.34 Under § 46(c), en banc review of a case "may be conducted if
such review 'is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit
who are in regular active service.' ' 35 In addition, the statute provides
that an en banc court generally consists of "all of the active judges on the
court.
3 6
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 provides the mechanism by
which "a party may suggest the appropriateness of convening the court in
banc."37  Generally "not favored, 38 en banc review may only occur
where "(1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain un-
iformity of the court's decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a ques-
tion of exceptional importance., 39 The need for uniformity most often
involves a conflict between two panel decisions.4° "Resolving conflicts
with Supreme Court precedent," clarifying cases of "general confusion
within the circuit," and "overruling precedent that appears to be out of
step with the current court" are also common reasons for granting en
banc review.
A decision to reconvene en banc based on uniformity is easier to
analyze than review for matters of "exceptional importance. 'A 2 The ex-
ceptional importance standard is far more subjective and is therefore
more difficult to apply in a consistent fashion.4 3 In many respects, the
31. George, supra note 3, at 230 & n.94.
32. FED. R. APp. P. 35(a); see, e.g., 10TH CR. R. 35.1(A).
33. 28 U.S.C.A. § 46(c) (West 2009).
34. FED. R. App. P. 35.
35. Harry W. Welford, Anna M. Vescovo & Lundy L. Boyd, Sixth Circuit En Banc Proce-
dures and Recent Sharp Splits, 30 U. MEM. L. REv. 479, 481 (2000) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
(1993 & Supp. 1999)).
36. Id.
37. FED. R. App. P. 35 advisory committee note (1967 adoption).
38. Id. 35(a).
39. Id. 35(a)(1)-(2).
40. Bergeron, supra note 1, at 783.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 782.
43. See id.
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exceptional importance standard is the default standard.44 Cases not ex-
hibiting issues of uniformity must necessarily fall into the category of
"exceptional importance." 45
Attempting to decode the meaning of "exceptional importance" is a
"somewhat elusive endeavor"46 that begs the question of whether courts
should weigh the impact on the public, the judiciary, or the parties. 7
"The public is concerned about cases that can have a widespread impact
on matters of interest to the community;" the court's interest may be in
"the need to streamline 'the administration of justice' within the cir-
cuit; ' 48 and the parties have at issue "large amounts of money or [matters
of] extraordinary emotional impact .... 49 Another reason that courts
agree to rehear cases en banc is to "correct an apparently erroneous re-
sult" made by either the panel or the binding precedent of an earlier pan-
el.50 The court's failure to clearly state its reasons for granting en banc
review makes it increasingly difficult to classify to whom the matter
must be exceptionally important and to what extent.
51
The Tenth and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals each have local rules
that address en banc review.52 Courts are entitled to considerable defe-
rence in interpreting and applying their own rules of practice and proce-
dure.53 Tenth Circuit Rule 35 provides that en banc review is limited to
panel decisions of exceptional public importance or those that conflict
with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court.54 D.C. Circuit Rule 35 is identical to Tenth Circuit Rule 35
except that it does not specify that matters must be of exceptional impor-
tance to the public.55
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT EN BANC: 2003-2007
The Tenth Circuit interprets Federal Rule 35 in its Tenth Circuit
Rule 35, which is nearly identical to Federal Rule 35.56 Like Federal
44. See id. at 782-83.
45. Id. at 782.
46. Id. at 784.
47. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc: 1981-1990, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1008, 1025 (1991).
48. Bergeron, supra note 1, at 784 (quoting Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 47, at 1028).
49. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 47, at 1032.
50. Id. at 1023.
51. See Bergeron, supra note 1, at 774-75.
52. See Labovitz, supra note 5, at 221-22, 226-27.
53. Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 796 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Lance, Inc. v.
Dewco Servs., Inc., 422 F.2d 778, 784 (9th Cir. 1970) (noting that "[li]ocal [r]ules are promulgated
by District Courts primarily to promote the efficiency of the Court, and that the Court has a large
measure of discretion in interpreting and applying them").
54. 10TH CiR. R. 35.1(A).
55. See D.C. CIR. R. 35.
56. See OTH CR. R. 35.1(A) ("En bane review is an extraordinary procedure intended to
focus the entire court on an issue of exceptional public importance or on a panel decision that con-
flicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court or of this court.").
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Rule 35, the Tenth Circuit's rule provides that "[a] request for en banc
consideration is disfavored., 57 The Tenth Circuit's adaptation of Federal
Rule 35 specifically requires that matters of exceptional importance be of
exceptional public importance.58 This single addition fundamentally
changes the analysis of the type of cases that merit en banc review.
The Tenth Circuit hears only a small number of cases by the full
court each year.59  From October 2003 through September 2007, the
Tenth Circuit resolved twenty-seven en banc appeals on the merits out of
7,670 total appeals, representing only .35 percent of the total number of
cases terminated on the merits.60 From these statistics it appears that the
Tenth Circuit heard roughly the average number of en banc cases as oth-
er circuit courts from the years 2003 to 2007.61
The twenty-seven en banc decisions in the Tenth Circuit from 2003
to 2007 present a variety of issues.62 The following three cases, present-
ing issues of Fourth Amendment rights, evidentiary hearings, and caps
on damages, exemplify the Tenth Circuit's approach in deciding which
cases meet the standard of "exceptional public importance."
A. Cortez v. McCauley
63
Cortez v. McCauley dealt with issues of constitutional rights and
freedoms, but the main issue driving en banc review was whether a claim
of excessive force must be subsumed into a claim of unlawful seizure.
64
It is likely that the full court agreed to rehear this case not because of its
exceptional public importance, but because of its future implications for
judicial administration within the circuit, and to provide finality for this
issue and establish controlling precedent.
In 2001, the Bernalillo County Sheriffs department responded to a
call from a nurse at a local hospital reporting complaints of sexual abuse
by a babysitter's husband. 65 The defendants-police officers McCauley,
Gonzales, Sanchez, and Covington-responded to the call immediately
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-l; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S- 1.
60. See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 thl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-l; 2003 ANNUALREPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S-l.
61. For this same time period, the number of en banc appeals terminated on the merits for all
United States Courts of Appeals was 304. Spread out over the twelve U.S. Courts of Appeals, the
average would be 25.3 appeals terminated on the merits, en banc. See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 46 tbl.S- 1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 50 tbl.S- 1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-l; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-1; 2003 ANNUAL
REPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S-1.
62. See cases listed infra Appendix.
63. 478 F.3d 1108 (10th Cir. 2007) (en banc).
64. Id. at 1112.
65. Id. at 1112-13 & n.1.
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without waiting for medical examination results confirming the abuse,
without taking the time to interview the child or the mother, and without
seeking to obtain a search warrant.66  When the defendants arrived at
babysitter Tina Cortez's home, two of the officers awoke her husband
Rick Cortez from his sleep, ordered him to exit his house, "seized him,
handcuffed him, read him his Miranda rights, and placed him in the back
of a patrol car .... 67 Meanwhile, Defendant McCauley entered the
Cortez's home, "seized [Tina Cortez] by the arm, and physically escorted
her from her home" to a separate patrol car for questioning.68 One of the
officers then searched the home without a warrant.
69
Plaintiffs Tina and Rick Cortez filed suit against employees of the
Bemalillo County Sheriffs Department and the Board of County Com-
missioners of the County of Bernalillo, New Mexico, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983.70 The Cortezes sought to recover for unlawful arrest,
excessive force, and unreasonable search of their home arising out of an
unsubstantiated claim of child molestation.7"
Circuit Judges Ebel, White, and Henry presided over the case and,
in an opinion by District Judge White of the District of Colorado, af-
firmed in part and reversed in part.72 Judge Henry concurred in part and
dissented in part with respect to Tina Cortez's excessive force claim,
arguing that the defendants clearly violated her right to be free from ex-
cessive force and that the excessive force claim should not have been
subsumed into the unlawful arrest claim.
73
All active judges of the court reheard the case en banc to consider
under what circumstances an excessive force claim could be subsumed
into an unlawful arrest claim.74 On rehearing en banc, the court affirmed
the panel's opinion in part and reversed in part. Judge Kelly wrote the
majority opinion upholding the district court's denial of qualified im-
munity, minus one excessive force claim.
76




70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West 2009) ("Every person who, under color of any statute
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the juris-
diction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law ... except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive
relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavail-
able.").
71. Cortez, 478F.3dat 1112.
72. Cortez v. McCauley, 438 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2006).
73. Id. at 1002-03 (Henry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
74. Cortez, 478 F.3d at 1112.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1112, 1132-33.
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The court broke down the unreasonable seizure claims into four
separate discussions of the Fourth Amendment and individually analyzed
each of the plaintiffs' excessive force claims.77 After analyzing each of
these claims, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the defen-
dants' motion for partial summary judgment based on qualified immuni-
ty as to Plaintiff Rick Cortez's claim of an unreasonable seizure, but re-
versed as to Plaintiff Rick Cortez's claim of excessive force in connec-
tion with the arrest. 78 The en banc court affirmed the district court's
denial of qualified immunity as to Plaintiff Tina Cortez.79 Circuit Judge
Kelly wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Judge Tacha and Cir-
cuit Judges Ebel, Henry, Briscoe, Lucero, and Murphy. 80 Circuit Judges
Hartz, McConnell, and Gorsuch each wrote separate dissenting opi-
nions. ' The main premise of the dissents was that the court overcompli-
cated the plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims.
82
The Cortez court did not discuss its reasons for granting en banc re-
83view. The court did note that it agreed to rehear the case to decide the
narrow issue of whether, "when a case contains claims for both an un-
lawful seizure and excessive force arising under the Fourth Amendment,
the latter claim must always be subsumed within and resolved in like
fashion as the former claim., 84 Rather than exceptional public impor-
tance or uniformity, this case appears to present an issue of judicial ad-
ministration regarding the treatment of unlawful seizure and excessive
force claims.
B. United States v. Nacchio
85
Although United States v. Nacchio involved a high-profile company
and has been a hot topic in the Colorado news, the case did not represent
issues of exceptional importance to the public as required by the Tenth
Circuit's local rules, but rather presented an issue of importance to judi-
cial administration in the circuit. Of the multiple issues involved, the en
banc court chose to ignore the substantive legal issues and instead to
rehear the "sleepier" issue concerning the exclusion of testimony and the
need for an evidentiary hearing when neither party requested it. This
again represents an issue of judicial administration.
The United States District Court for the District of Colorado con-
victed Defendant Joseph Nacchio, former CEO of Qwest Communica-
77. See id. at 1115-32.
78. Id. at 1132-33.
79. Id. at 1133.
80. Id. at 1112. Circuit Judges Hartz, O'Brien, McConnell, Tymkovich, Gorsuch, and
Holmes joined in part. Id.
81. Id. at 1133-49.
82. See id. at 1133 (Hartz, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. See id. at 1112-15.
84. Id. at 1137-38 (Gorsuch, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
85. 519 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 2008).
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tions International, Inc., of nineteen counts of insider trading.86 Nacchio
appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict, that the
jury was improperly instructed, and that the trial judge improperly ex-
cluded expert testimony and classified information that Nacchio's key
expert witness sought to introduce.87 The trial court judge excluded the
expert's testimony on the ground that Nacchio's Rule 16 disclosure
failed to discuss the witness's methodology.88 The defense's strategy
rested on the key expert witness testimony of Professor Daniel Fischel
and classified information regarding Qwest's business prospects.89 The
district court kept both out of court.90
"The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require a defendant un-
der certain circumstances to provide to the government, upon request, 'a
written summary of any testimony that the defendant intends to use [at
trial] under Rules 702,91 703,92 or 70593 of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence."' 94  "The summary must describe the witness's opinions, the
bases and reasons for these opinions, and the witness's qualifications."
95
The defense disclosed its intent to call expert witness Professor Daniel
Fischel to testify about Nacchio's trading patterns in an economic con-
text, and the "economic importance of the allegedly material inside in-
formation." 96 The district court agreed with the government's argument
that this disclosure was insufficient under Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure Rule 1697 "because the defense had 'offer[ed] no bases or reasons
whatsoever for Professor Fischel's opinions contained in the sum-
n ,r.',,98
mary-.ii
The defense then filed a revised disclosure describing Fischel's
background and qualifications as an expert witness and stating his belief
that "Mr. Nacchio's sales were inconsistent with what one would expect
86. Id. at 1144.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1148, 1150.
89. Id. at 1148.
90. Id.
91. FED. R. EviD. 702 (requiring the expert witness' testimony to be based upon sufficient
facts or data, to be a product of reliable principles and methods, and requiring that the witness has
applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case).
92. FED. R. EvID. 703 (stating that facts of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field in forming opinions or inferences on the subject need not be admissible in evidence
in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted).
93. FED. R. EviD. 705 (stating that the expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and
give reasons therefore without first testifying to the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires
otherwise).
94. Nacchio, 519 F.3d at 1149 (quoting FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(C)).
95. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(l)(C).
96. Nacchio, 519 F.3d at 1149.
97. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(l)(C)(ii) (2008) (requiring a defendant to notify the Govern-
ment of its intent to call an expert witness and provide a summary of the expert's testimony, the
reasons and basis for his opinion and his qualifications).
98. Nacchio, 519 F.3d at 1149 (quoting App. at 352).
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them to be if the government's claims were true." 99 When it came time
to call Fischel to the stand, the district court judge dismissed the jury and
declared the testimony inadmissible.' °° The judge reasoned that the de-
fendant had failed to meet Rule 16 and that the "expert economic analy-
sis would 'invit[e] the jurors to abandon their own common sense and
common experience and succumb to this expert's credentials.'
1 0'
On appeal, the case went before a panel of three judges comprised
of Circuit Judges Kelly, McConnell, and Holmes.l0 2 The appellate court
held that it was an abuse of discretion to exclude Fischel's testimony,
and that an expert witness could not be excluded solely on the basis of a
deficiency in a Rule 16 disclosure without the opportunity for briefing or
hearing. 10 3 Because the improper exclusion of Fischel's testimony preju-
diced Nacchio's defense, the court reversed his conviction and left the
government the ability to try him a second time. °4 The case was re-
manded for a new trial before a different district court judge.10 5 Circuit
Judge Holmes dissented in part and concurred in part.'
°6
The full circuit convened on September 25, 2008 for the en banc
hearing, but for reasons unstated, Judges O'Brien, Tymkovich, and Gor-
such did not participate, 10 7 leaving only nine of the twelve judges to re-
solve the case. With the views of Holmes, Kelly and McConnell clear,
the outcome depended on six "wild card" judges, including Judges Hen-
ry, Tacha, Briscoe, Lucero, Murphy and Hartz.
The court did not include its reasoning for agreeing to rehear the
case en banc in its order granting the petition, nor did any judges file a
dissent from the order. 10 8 The issues to be reconsidered en banc primari-
ly concerned the evidentiary hearing. 1°9 The en banc court ignored the
materiality issue. " Although the court did not include its reasoning for
granting the petition for rehearing en banc, the parties' briefs in support
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1150 (quoting App. at 3920).
102. Id. at 1144.
103. See id. at 1154.
104. Id. at 1169.
105. Id. at 1169-70. Judge Nottingham has since stepped down.
106. Id. at 1170 (Holmes, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
107. See United States v. Nacchio, 535 F.3d 1165, 1165 (10th Cir. 2008) (en banc).
108. See id. at 1165-66.
109. See id. at 1166. The full list of issues to be reconsidered en banc were:
(1) Was the defendant sufficiently on notice that he was required either to present evi-
dence in support of the expert's methodology or request an evidentiary hearing in ad-
vance of presenting the expert's testimony? (2) Did the defendant have an adequate op-
portunity to present such evidence or request an evidentiary hearing in advance of pre-
senting the expert's testimony? (3) Did the defendant bear the burden of requesting an
evidentiary hearing? (4) Did the district court abuse its discretion in disallowing the evi-
dence, and if so, is the appropriate remedy necessarily a new trial, or is a remand for pur-
poses of conducting an evidentiary heaing adequate?
Id.
110. See id. at 1165-66.
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and in opposition of en banc review suggest possible facts and issues that
the court may have taken into consideration.
In its petition for rehearing en banc, the government argued that the
panel's decision both (1) departed from precedent, and (2) threatened to
restrict the judges' "traditional and important discretion to exclude un-
supported expert opinions and unnecessary economic commentary." ''
This argument goes to the uniformity standard of Rule 35.112 The gov-
ernment also argued that "the universe of potentially affected cases is
broad" and that "the panel's decision presents questions of exceptional
importance warranting en banc review."
'' 13
In opposition to the government's petition for rehearing en banc, the
defense argued that en banc review was unwarranted because (1) the
government's decision announced no new law, (2) the court's decision
was correct and the government did not even claim that it directly con-
flicted with other Tenth Circuit precedent, and (3) the court's opinion did
not impose costly and unnecessary burdens on district courts to always
hold hearings before excluding testimony as the government argued.
114
The discussion in the courtroom centered on whether it was an
abuse of the court's discretion to fail to hold a hearing before excluding
Fischel's expert testimony and whether this required a new trial." 5 Mau-
reen Mahoney, counsel for Nacchio, began her argument by noting that
"the case had come down to the sole question of whether the defense
forfeited the right to present Fischel's testimony by the failure to ask for
a hearing." ' 16 Mahoney argued that the defense was given insufficient
time to request a hearing, and that the exclusion of Fischel's testimony
was a complete surprise. 1 7 Edwin Kneedler, counsel for the govern-
ment, argued that the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Fis-
chel's testimony, and that the defense "had opportunity after the fact to
revisit the exclusion issue but did not take all the steps they could [have
taken]."118
The court issued its opinion on rehearing en banc on February 29,
2009, five months after the en banc hearing. 119 In a 5-4 decision, the
majority opinion-written by Judge Holmes who also wrote the dissent-
ing panel opinion-held that Fischel's expert testimony was properly
111. Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Nacchio, 519 F.3d 1140 (No. 07-1311), 2008 WL
2072295.
112. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1).
113. Petition for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 111, at 2.
114. See Appellant's Opposition to the Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, 10, Nacchio, 519
F.3d 1140 (No. 07-131 1), 2008 WL 2113264.
115. See Posting of J. Robert Brown to The Race to the Bottom,




119. United States v. Nacchio, No. 07-1311, 2009 WL 455666 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 2009).
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excluded and thus affirmed the district court's judgment. 120 Judges Ta-
cha, Briscoe, Lucero and Hartz joined in the majority opinion. 21 The en
banc decision vacated the panel's opinion and reinstated Nacchio's con-
viction.122 Judge Holmes and the en banc majority held that: (1) defen-
dant "was sufficiently on notice that he was required to present evidence
in support of his expert's testimony;" 123 (2) the burden of requesting a
hearing fell to the defendant;' 24 and (3) "the district court properly per-
formed its Daubert gatekeeping role in excluding Professor Fischel's
testimony as inadmissible for lack of reliability."'' 2 5 Judge McConnell,
who wrote the panel majority opinion, dissented and was joined by Chief
Judge Henry, Judge Kelly, who also joined in the panel majority opinion,
and Judge Murphy.
126
C. Robbins v. Chronister 1
7
Robbins v. Chronister examined whether to place a cap on the at-
torneys' fees for those representing prisoners as proposed by the Prison-
ers' Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA").128  At stake in this case was
whether the prevailing party's attorneys' fees should be capped at $1.50
or if the fees should stand at roughly $9,000.129 Given that the decision
of the case would impact future applications of the cap on attorneys' fees
under the PLRA, and that the court would likely encounter this issue
again, it is possible that the court agreed to rehear the case en banc as a
matter of judicial administration.
Plaintiff-Appellee Ralph Robbins, who happened to have several
traffic warrants out for his arrest at the time, waited was waiting in his
car for a pump to become available when a police officer, Chronister,
pulled into the gas station.13  Officer Chronister recognized Robbins
from an altercation a few weeks earlier and approached, baton in hand.' 3'
Chronister identified himself but Robbins refused to get out of his car.
3 2
Chronister shattered the car window with his baton and attempted to pull
Robbins through. 33 While attempting to get away, Robbins' car fish-
120. Id. at *1.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at *7.
124. Id. at *12.
125. Id. at *17.
126. Id. at *16.
127. 402 F.3d 1047 (loth Cir. 2005), rev'd en banc, 435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006).
128. Robbins, 402 F.3d at 1048.
129. See id. at 1049.






tailed on the icy pavement, toward Chronister. 34 Chronister shot twice,
striking Robbins' chest and side.
135
Robbins pled guilty to aggravated assault of a police officer and
filed a complaint alleging excessive force in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights. 136  The court held that Chronister's use of deadly
force in shooting at the car was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,
but that shattering the driver side window with his baton was not.137 Not
physically injured from Chronister's breaking of the window, Robbins
received nominal damages equal to one dollar. 138 Robbins filed a motion
to recover attorneys' fees and Chronister responded by arguing that at-
torneys' fees should be capped at 150% of the damages awarded, or
$1.50.139 Chronister based his argument on § 1997e(d)(2) of the
PLRA, 14° because Robbins was imprisoned when he filed suit.' 4'
Judges Seymour, McWilliams, and Hartz declined to cap the attor-
neys' fees, upholding the ruling of the trial court that reasoned "applying
the PLRA in these circumstances would produce an absurd result be-
cause Congress could not have intended the statute to apply to merito-
rious civil rights claims that arose prior to a prisoner's confinement."'
' 42
The court awarded Robbins $9,680 in attorneys' fees and $915.16 in
expenses. Chronister sought en banc review, arguing that the fee cap
should have been enforced. 143 Judge Hartz dissented, disagreeing with
the majority's view that "it would be absurd to think Congress wished to
apply [the PLRA] to suits alleging preconfinement [sic] misconduct."'
144
The full court convened to rehear the case. 145 Judge Hartz wrote the
en banc opinion, reflecting the court's decision to reverse the district
court's award of attorneys' fees and limit the award to $1.50.1 46 The
court did not give explicit reasons for agreeing to rehear the case, but
Hartz's dissent and the decision of the en banc court indicate that the
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1049; see also U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vi-
olated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.").
137. Robbins, 402 F.3d at 1049.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(d)(2) (West 2009) ("Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in
an action ... a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the
amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not
greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.").
141. Robbins, 402 F.3d at 1049.
142. Id. at 1048-49.
143. Id. at 1049.
144. Id. at 1055 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
145. Robbins v. Chronister, 435 F.3d 1238, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
146. Id. at 1244.
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court may have been motivated by the absurdity of applying the PLRA
cap where the inmate's suit alleged pre-confinement misconduct.
147
There is no mention of a uniformity issue motivating en banc re-
view, nor is there an explicit discussion of "exceptional importance." A
matter concerning caps on damages does not appear to be of exceptional
importance to the public, especially when contrasted with the type of
cases that the D.C. Circuit commonly rehears en banc. Nor do the facts
suggest that the case represented an issue of exceptional importance to
the parties. However, it is possible that the court agreed to rehear Rob-
bins en banc as a matter of judicial administration. The court might have
believed that the original panel had reached an erroneous result, or simp-
ly wanted to clear up the question of whether attorneys' fees should be
capped under the PLRA.
III. THE D.C. CIRCUIT EN BANc: 2003-2007
The D.C. Circuit's local Rule 35 is virtually indistinguishable from
Federal Rule 35. 148 The wording of the sections discussing uniformity
and exceptional importance are an identical match.149 Unlike the Tenth
Circuit's Rule 35, the D.C. Circuit's Rule 35 standard for en banc review
retains the Federal standard of "exceptional importance" without the
additional qualifier of "to the public." 5° In theory, this leaves the D.C.
Circuit with broader discretion in applying the exceptional importance
standard.
The D.C. Circuit rarely takes cases en banc. From the years 2003 to
2007, the D.C. Circuit consistently ranked among the lowest number of
appeals heard en banc in the U.S. Courts of Appeals.' 15 From 2003-
2007, the D.C. Circuit decided a total of ten appeals on the merits en
banc, compared to an all-circuit average of 23 during that time. 12 This
represented only .38 percent of the total appeals terminated on the merits
after oral hearings or submission on briefs in the D.C. Circuit. 53 Of the
ten cases that the D.C. Circuit terminated on the merits en banc from
2003 to 2007, the following two cases dealt with access to prescription
drugs for the terminally ill and a federal wire-tapping scandal.
147. See id. at 1239; Robbins, 402 F.3d at 1055 (Hartz, J., dissenting).
148. Compare Fed. R. APP. P. 35, with D.C. CIR. R. 35.
149. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1)-(2); D.C. CR. R. 35(a)(1)-(2).
150. Compare FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2), and D.C. CiR. R. 35(a)(2), with 10TH CR. R. 35.1(A).
151. See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-I; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S-1.
152. See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-l; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-1; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S-1; see also infra
Appendix.
153. See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S- 1; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S- 1.
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A. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von
Eschenbach
154
Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von
Eschenbach represents the type of case that the D.C. Circuit typically
rehears en banc because of its exceptional importance on a national level.
The case concerned the availability of experimental drugs to terminally
ill patients across the United States. It also involved issues of fundamen-
tal human rights and constitutional issues that gained national attention.
Plaintiff Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental
Drugs ("Abigail Alliance"), a public interest group, sued to enjoin the
Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") from barring the sale of experi-
mental drugs not yet approved for public use to terminally ill patients.
55
The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") prohibits access to new
drugs "unless and until they have been approved by the [FDA].' 56 The
approval process for a new drug is often lengthy and requires multiple
steps.157 Abigail Alliance's complaint alleged that the FDA's new drugtesting process was excessively drawn out. 58
Abigail Alliance petitioned the FDA, proposing that early access to
investigational drugs be allowed "based upon 'the risk of illness, injury,
or death from the disease in the absence of the drug.' ' 159 The FDA re-
sponded by arguing that Abigail Alliance's proposal would place too
much emphasis on the early availability of drugs to terminally ill patients
and not enough on the investigation of the drug's benefits and risks.
16°
After rejection by the FDA, Abigail Alliance "turned to the courts."
161
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed Abigail
Alliance's complaint challenging the FDA's refusal to allow access to
experimental drugs to terminally ill patients under the FDCA. 
162
The full court of the D.C. Circuit convened to consider the issue of
"whether the Constitution provides terminally ill patients a right of
access to experimental drugs that have passed limited safety trials but
have not been proven safe and effective."1 63 Judge Griffith wrote the
majority opinion, with Judges Rogers and Ginsburg dissenting."6 On
154. 495 F.3d 695(D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
155. Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 445 F.3d
470, 471-72 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 495 F.3d. 695 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Abigail Al-
liance "is an organization of terminally ill patients and supporters that seeks to expand access to
experimental drugs for the terminally ill." Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697.
156. Abigail Alliance, 495 F.3d at 697.
157. Id.
158. Id. at698.
159. Id. at 699 (quoting Abigail Alliance's petition to the FDA).
160. Id. at 700.
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. Id. at 697.
164. Id. at 695.
2009] 1083
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
rehearing en banc, the court opted to hear the due process question and
voted to vacate the panel's decision, holding that "there is no fundamen-
tal right 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' of access to
experimental drugs for the terminally ill. ' 165 Accordingly, the en banc
court affirmed the judgment of the district court, upholding the FDA's
policy of limiting access to investigational drugs to the terminally ill.' 66
This case demonstrates the D.C. Circuit's practice of taking cases en
banc that are exceptionally important to the public on a national level.
B. Boehner v. McDermott 67
Boehner v. McDermott also represents the D.C. Circuit's standards
for rehearing a case en banc. The case involved constitutional issues,
public political figures, and scandal. Boehner received attention on a
national level in the media and in the legal and political communities,
and was eventually reviewed by the Supreme Court. The decision to
grant en banc review in Boehner is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's
practice of agreeing to convene the full court for matters of exceptional
national public importance.
Defendant James McDermott, a Democratic member of the House
of Representatives, disclosed to the New York Times and the Atlanta
Journal-Constitution the contents of an illegally intercepted conference
call between Plaintiff John Boehner, a Republican member of the House
of Representatives, and several other House Republican leaders. 168 The
intercepted conversation also included Newt Gingrich, who was under-
going investigation by the House Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct, the "House Ethics Committee."' 69 The purpose of the confe-
rence call was to discuss "how they might deal with an expected Ethics
Committee announcement of Gingrich's agreement to accept a reprimand
and to pay a fine in exchange for the Committee's promise not to hold a
hearing.
170
John and Alice Martin, residents of Florida, used a police radio
scanner to pick up the conversation through the in-range cellular tele-
phone of Plaintiff Boehner, who was in Florida at the time.'71 The Mar-
tins recorded the conference call and turned it in to a Florida Representa-
tive who refused delivery of the tape.172 The Martins then delivered the
tape-along with a letter stating that the Martins "understand that [they]
will be granted immunity"-to Defendant McDermott, who was the
165. See id. at 697 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)).
166. d. at 713.
167. 484 F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
168. See id. at 575-76.
169. Id. at 575.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 575-76.
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ranking Democrat on the Ethics Committee at the time. 73 McDermott
accepted the tape.
1 74
Upon listening to the tape, McDermott called reporters at both the
New York Times and the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, both of which
subsequently published articles relating to the wiretapped conference.
75
Neither of the articles named McDermott as the leak, but the Martins
named McDermott in a press conference and he resigned from the Ethics
Committee.
1 76
Boehner's complaint alleged that McDermott's disclosure violated
18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(c), a wire-tapping statute which "makes intentional
disclosure of any illegally intercepted conversation a criminal offense if
the person disclosing the communication knew or had 'reason to know'
that it was so acquired." 177 The district court found a violation and, on
appeal, a panel of the D.C. Circuit comprised of Chief Judge Ginsburg
and Circuit Judges Sentelle and Randolph affirmed. 178 Judge Sentelle
dissented. 179 The D.C. Circuit court granted en banc review.'
80
All active judges of the D.C. Circuit met to review the case en
banc 81 The issue to be decided was whether Defendant McDermott had
a First Amendment right to disclose the tape to the press given the man-
ner in which he received the tape, his ongoing proceedings before the
Ethics Committee, and McDermott's position as a member of the Com-
mittee.182 On rehearing en banc, the court affirmed the panel's grant of
summary judgment to Plaintiff Boehner, ruling that McDermott did not
have a First Amendment right to disclose the tape.
1 83
The en banc court reasoned that when McDermott became a mem-
ber of the House of Representatives Ethics Committee, he accepted a
duty of confidentiality that superseded his First Amendment right to dis-
close the wiretap recording to the press.1 84 Because McDermott's speech
was limited by the Committee's rules, he was not able to invoke First
Amendment protection against charges under the wiretap statutes of the
United States and Florida. 85 Judge Randolph filed the majority opinion,
with Circuit Judge Griffith concurring. 186 Judge Sentelle filed a dissent
173. Id. at 576.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 576-77.
176. See id. at 577.
177. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 251 l(1)(c) (2006)).
178. Boehner v. McDermott, 441 F.3d 1010, 1010-11 (D.C. Cir. 2006), vacated en banc, 484
F.3d 573 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
179. Boehner, 441 F.3d at 1017.
180. See Boehner, 484 F.3d at 574.
181. See id.
182. Id. at 577.
183. Id. at 581.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 579-81.
186. Id. at 575, 581.
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joined by Judges Rogers, Tatel, Garland, and Griffith. 187 The issue in
this case, First Amendment freedom of speech, exemplifies the type of
case that the D.C. Circuit typically agrees to rehear en banc because of
the exceptional national importance.
IV. TENTH CIRCUIT EN BANC REVIEW OF UNITED STATES V. NAcCHIo
Federal Rule 35 states that decisions to grant en banc review are
"not favored."' 88 Similarly, Tenth Circuit Rule 35 allows en banc review
only for "an issue of exceptional public importance or a panel decision
that conflicts with a decision of the United States Supreme Court" or
with some precedent in the Tenth Circuit. 89 Despite the circuit's strict
rules, the court interprets "exceptional public importance" loosely and
often takes cases based on importance to judicial administration, as dem-
onstrated by Cortez, Robbins, and Nacchio.
Nacchio affects the proper functioning of the trial courts in the
Tenth Circuit.190 As stated in a post on the blog theracetothebottom.org,
"[t]he panel decision (finding that the failure to hold an unrequested
hearing was reversible error) affects every trial judge in the circuit." 191
The blog post noted that if the panel opinion remains in place, the cir-
cuit's trial courts "will likely be forced to hold hearings sua sponte even
when not requested in order to insulate their decision from reversal. ' 92
This, of course, would prove unfavorable to the courts, as it would be "an
inefficient, time consuming addition to the work load [sic] of already
busy courts., 193 The blog post presents a compelling argument that it
was the impact on the trial courts that created the "exceptional impor-
tance" motivating en banc review. 194
V. UNITED STATES V. NAccHIo IN THE D.C. CIRCUIT?
Some have concluded that D.C. Circuit judges are more politicized
than other circuits. 195 As a result, they may have a different approach to
en banc review. Because D.C. Circuit judges often have Supreme Court
aspirations, this might lead the court to hold petitions for en banc review
to a higher standard of exceptional national importance. 96 Compared to
Tenth Circuit judges, who are not known to "seriously aspire" to sit on
the Supreme Court bench, and who are "generally not motivated by pub-
licity or the need to demonstrate their intellectual acumen by writing
187. Id. at 581.
188. FED. R. APP. P. 35(a).
189. 1OTH. C .R. 35.1(A).
190. See posting of J. Robert Brown to The Race to the Bottom,









ground breaking opinions," D.C. Circuit judges may be more particular
in selecting the cases that merit the attention of the full court.
19 7
The D.C. Circuit consistently hears a very low number of cases en
banc each year.198 The Circuit also tends to grant en banc review to is-
sues of national public importance, fitting with the idea that the judges of
the D.C. Circuit are primarily concerned with matters that would merit
the attention of the Supreme Court, the public, and the media on a na-
tional level. Although the D.C. Circuit's rules do not reflect its focus on
matters of public importance, its practice of en banc procedure indicates
that possibly the most important factor in granting en banc review in the
D.C. Circuit is whether a case presents an issue that will gain national
attention and readership.
Two cases recently heard en banc by the D.C. Circuit include Ab-
igail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschen-
bach and Boehner v. McDermott. Each of these cases presented an issue
of exceptional national public importance. In examining the following
two cases, and keeping in mind the D.C. Circuit's rules governing en
banc review, it appears doubtful that Nacchio would have merited en
banc review if the case were in the jurisdiction of the D.C. Circuit.
Abigail Alliance presented the issue of whether terminally ill pa-
tients should have earlier access to investigational drugs. 199 The decision
of whether to allow terminally ill patients access to investigative drugs
has widespread national impact, and the issue of preserving fundamental
Constitutional rights is certainly a matter of exceptional importance. The
Supreme Court also deemed Abigail Alliance worthy of its time and at-
tention, another factor that is consistent with the D.C. Circuit's reasoning
in its decision to grant en banc review.
Boehner dealt with a matter concerning speakers of the United
States House of Representatives and a "scandal" that was widely re-
ported in the national media at the time. The case's "flashy" nature, the
national media coverage, and the fact that it involved highly public fig-
ures all may have played a role in the D.C. Circuit's decision to take on
the case en banc.
CONCLUSION
In reviewing the cases that the Tenth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit
agreed to rehear en banc from 2003 to 2007, it appears that the Tenth
Circuit tends to rehear a higher number of cases en banc, including even
197. Id.
198. See 2007 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 46 tbl.S-1; 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 10, at 50 tbl.S-1; 2005 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 10, at 40 tbl.S-1; 2004 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 10, at 37 tbl.S-1; 2003 ANNUAL REPORT; supra note 10, at 34 tbl.S-l.
199. Abigail Alfiance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d
695, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc).
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the "sleepiest" of issues. The D.C. Circuit, which hears far fewer cases
en banc each year, is more selective in the cases it chooses to rehear en
banc, and seems to focus its en banc attention to "flashy" cases that are
likely to gain attention on a national level.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision to grant en banc re-
view in United States v. Nacchio, despite its failure to meet the require-
ments of federal (Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35) and local
(Tenth Circuit Rule 35) rules governing en banc review, exemplifies the
court's use of broad discretion in applying its local rules. The court's
decision also represents the complex and convoluted process of en banc
review.
It was the decision's impact on the functioning efficiency and the
workload of the trial courts, and not the public impact, that motivated the
court to grant the government's petition for en banc review in Nacchio.
In comparing the Tenth Circuit's en banc rules and standards to those of
the D.C. Circuit, and considering that the D.C. Circuit has historically
only reheard cases en banc that clearly satisfy the exceptional importance
standard on a national level, it is unlikely that Nacchio would have me-
rited en banc review in the D.C. Circuit. Since the result of the Tenth
Circuit's decision to rehear Nacehio en banc was to vacate the panel opi-
nion and reinstate the conviction, it appears that Nacchio was unlucky to
be subjected to suit in the Tenth Circuit.
Sarah J. Berkus*
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